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Adversarial Examples: Attacks on Machine Learning-based Malware
Visualization Detection Methods
Xinbo Liu, Yapin Lin, He Li, Jiliang Zhang, Member, IEEE
As the threat of malicious software (malware) becomes urgently serious, automatic malware detection techniques have received
increasing attention recently, where the machine learning (ML)-based visualization detection plays a significant role. However, this
leads to a fundamental problem whether such detection methods can be robust enough against various potential attacks. Even
though ML algorithms show superiority to conventional ones in malware detection in terms of high efficiency and accuracy, this
paper demonstrates that such ML-based malware detection methods are vulnerable to adversarial examples (AE) attacks. We
propose the first AE-based attack framework, named Adversarial Texture Malware Perturbation Attacks (ATMPA), based on the
gradient descent or L-norm optimization method. By introducing tiny perturbations on the transformed dataset, ML-based malware
detection methods completely fail. The experimental results on the MS BIG malware dataset show that a small interference can
reduce the detection rate of convolutional neural network (CNN), support vector machine (SVM) and random forest(RF)-based
malware detectors down to 0 and the attack transferability can achieve up to 88.7% and 74.1% on average in different ML-based
detection methods.
Index Terms—Adversarial Examples, Malware Detection, Image Texture, Machine Learning, Data visualization.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the rapid development of the Internet and smart-phones, the number of malicious software has been
growing unexpectedly in recent years. More than 3.24 million
new malwares were detected in Android application market in
2016 [1]. In 2017, Google Play intercepted more than 700,000
malicious software applications with an annual growth of 70%
[2]. These counterfeit applications use unwrapped content or
Malware to impersonate legitimate applications and interfere
with the normal software market. According to the recent report
from AV-TEST, even though the popular ransomware accounts
for less than 1% of the total malware, billions of dollars has
been lost since 2016 [3].
Malware denotes a particular type of programs that perform
malicious tasks and illegal controls on computer systems by
breaking software processes to obtain the unauthorized access,
interrupt normal operations and steal information on computers
or mobile devices. There is a variety kinds of malwares
including viruses, Trojans, worms, backdoors, rootkits, spyware,
ransomware and panic software, etc. [4]. Countermeasures
against such malware threat can be classified into three cases:
digital signatures [5], static code analysis [6] and dynamic code
analysis [7], to safeguard the digital world away from malware.
For traditional digital signature methods, since the number of
new signatures released every year grows exponentially [5],
it is undesirable to use a digital signature-based method to
determine each sample and detect the malicious behavior one
by one. Static code analysis can detect malware in a complete
coverage through the disassembling, but it usually suffers from
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the code obfuscation. In addition, executable files must be
unpacked and decrypted before analysis which significantly
limits the detection efficiency. Compared to static code analysis,
dynamic code analysis is not required to unpack or decrypt
the execution files in a virtual environment. However, it is
time-intensive and resource-consuming. Scalability is another
important issue to be considered [7]. More importantly, methods
mentioned above are difficult to detect some certain malicious
behaviors that are well camouflage or not satisfied by trigger
conditions.
As the development of machine learning and visualization
techniques, researchers borrow the visualization idea from the
field of computer forensics and network monitoring and use
it to classify malware [8]. By converting binary code into
image data, the approach can not only visualize the feature
information of various types of samples but also improve the
detection speed of malicious software. The detection process is
more simplified than conventional approaches. Optimizations
for ML algorithms have further improved the development of
malware visualization detection techniques [4], [9], [10], in
terms of preventing zero-day attacks, non-destructive detection
of malware without extracting preselected features, improving
accuracy and robustness for detection and reducing time and
memory consumption.
However, adversarial Examples (AEs) are special samples
generated from the original dataset with tiny additional per-
turbations and are indistinguishable from the discriminative
model so that erroneous detection results can be induced. AEs
were originally proposed by Szegedy et al. [11] in 2014. Since
the discriminative model is constructed by the dataset without
AEs, the detection accuracy can be incredibly reduced due to
AEs. A large number of AE-construction methods [11]–[15]
and related AE-defence techniques [16]–[20] were proposed.
In this paper, we propose the first approach to attack different
ML-based visualization malware detection methods based
on AEs, named Adversarial Texture Malware Perturbation
Attacking (ATMPA). We extract the features of the state-of-
the-art approaches for AE generation and use the Rectifier in
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neural-network hidden layers to improve the robustness for AEs
training. ATMPA is employed into three malware visualization
techniques to verify the attack effectiveness and transferability.
In the experimental evaluation, we use the malware dataset
from the MS BIG database and then convert it to a set of
binary texture grayscale images. AEs generated by training such
grayscale images are used to attack three ML-based detectors,
i.e. CNN, SVM and RF, and their wavelet combined versions.
The experimental results demonstrate that all of ML-based
malware detection methods are vulnerable to our ATMPA
attack with the successful rate of 100%. When performing
the transferability test among different ML-based detection
methods, ATMPA can achieve attack transferability up to 88.7%
and 74.1% on average.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• The first attack framework for ML-based malware de-
tectors by using AEs and demonstrating the security
vulnerabilities of ML applications.
• Analysis of various AE variants to summarize an optimal
infringement for ML-based malware detectors.
• Evaluation and comparison analysis for the proposed
ATMPA in terms of the rate of feasibility and transfer-
ability for CNN, SVM and RF-based malware detectors.
• Extracting the feature of AE-based attacks along with
several countermeasure solutions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
details the related work of malware visualization detection
methods associated with the AE techniques. Three kinds of
ML-based malware visualization detection algorithms and two
popular AE crafting methods are introduced in Section III.
Section IV describes the proposed Adversarial Texture Malware
Perturbation Attacking (ATMPA) method, and elaborates the
design flow, model structure and algorithm pseudocode of this
method. We show the experimental results in Section V and
analyze the parameters that generate the AE for malware and
demonstrate the effectiveness of ATMPA. Moreover, we gives
some qualitative defensive strategies against AE-based attack
in Section VI. Finally, we make a conclusion and provide some
future research directions in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Background of AE
Adversarial Examples (AEs) work for crafting subtle pertur-
bations on original datasets for image classification problems
and are able to fool the state-of-the-art deep neural networks
(DNN) with high probability. In general, transferability and
robustness are two key features for AEs. The transferability
refers to the degree to which a particular AE attack can be
transferred to function as other types of AEs for different
attacks. The robustness represents the ability to withstand or
overcome AE attacks. Prior work can be classified into un-
targeted and targeted AEs. Un-targeted AEs can cause the
classifier to produce any incorrect output without specifying
a predicted category, while targeted AEs cause the classifier
to produce a specific incorrect output. In the past three years,
various AE crafting methods were proposed, such as L-BFGS
[11], FGSM [12], JSMA [13], C&W’s attack [14], DeepFool
[15] as well as Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [21].
Among them, researches have shown that FGSM [12] and
C&W’s attack methods [14] are the most popular choices for
generating AEs [22], [23]. We hence focus on the both in this
paper.
B. Code analysis-based malware detection approach
Code analysis-based malware detection can be classified
into static code analysis and dynamic code analysis. Static
code analysis is used to analyze malware without executing the
program. The detection patterns used in static analysis include
byte-sequence n-grams, string signature, control flow graph,
syntactic library call and opcode (operational code) frequency
distribution etc. [24]. For example, disassemblers (e.g. IDA
Pro [25] and OllyDbg [26]) and memory dumper tools (e.g.
LordPE [27] and OllyDump [28]) can usually be used to reverse
compile executables to analyze the malware statically. On the
other hand, analysing the behaviour of a malicious code being
executed in a controlled environment such as virtual machine,
simulator and emulator is called as dynamic code analysis [7].
Dynamic code analysis is more effective as it discloses the
natural behaviour of malware. Nowadays, there exists several
automated tools for dynamic analysis, such as CWSandbox
[29], TTAnalyzer [30], Ether [31], Norman Sandbox [32] etc.
However, it is time-consuming to read the analysis report
generated by these tools to understand malware behavior.
C. ML-based malware detection approach
In order to accelerate the malware detection process, ML-
based visualization detection methods have received a great
attention in recent years. This kind of method has been proposed
for detecting and classifying unknown samples into either
known malware families or underline those samples that exhibit
unseen behavior. However, when meeting with the different
sample types these ML-based methods have limited detection
ability. To overcome this, ML-based visualization detection
methods have been proposed to detect all types of malware. The
indistinguishable malware can be easily detected by different
detectors based on RF [33], SVM [4], CNN [9] and GAN [21],
by virtue of the transformed binary grayscale images.
D. AE-based attack
AEs are used to bypass the detection of malicious codes.
Gross et al. [10] used AEs to interfere with the binary
features of Android malware. They aimed to attack DNN-
based detection for Android malware and retain malicious
features in the Apps. But this kind of attack is only adapted to
some Android malware samples processed by binary features.
As for the end-to-end static code detection techniques using
convolutional neural networks, F. Kreuk et al. [34] used AEs to
extract the feature information from binary code and disguised
malware as a benign sample by injecting a small sequence of
bytes (payload) in the binary file. This method not only retains
the original function of malware but also achieves the purpose
of deceiving global binary malware detector. However, it is
extremely sensitive to discrete input dataset such as executable
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bytes. Minor modifications to the bytes of the file may lead
to significant changes in its functionality and validity. Hu et
al. [35] proposed a method of generating sequential AEs by
improving the robustness of its adversarial pertaining process,
which can be used to attack the sequential API features-based
malware in RNN detection system. The drawbacks of this
method are time-consuming and large overhead in the whole
processing. Different from the existing studies using AEs to
escape the malware detection, this paper proposes the first
method using AEs to attack ML-based visualization detectors,
named ATMPA, which is a new attack framework based
on visual transformation that employs specifically designed
adversarial noise to deceive deep learning detection tools and
other ML-based detectors according to the transferability of
AEs [36]. The noise is tenuous so that it is not significantly
noticed and we can obtain a high transferability rate between
different detectors.
III. PRELIMINARY
Before presenting our methodology, some preliminary theory
used in this paper are detailed in the following, including
malware visualization and ML-based detection methods.
A. Malware Visualization
Malware visualization methods [4], [8], [37], [38] transform
the hard-to-identify code information into image data with cer-
tain feature information. A specific segment of code represents
a definite type of malware. Lee et al. [39] firstly applied the
visualization technology to accelerate the process of malware
detection.
The visualisation process includes the following steps. To
begin with, we collect the malware sample set that needs
to be transformed and read samples as a vector of 8-bit
unsigned integers. After that, we can organize the set of vectors
into a two-dimensional array. The corresponding value in the
array can be expressed as the gray value of the image in
the range from 0 to 255, where 0 indicates black and 255
means white. According to the different characteristics and
analytical requirements for different data sets, the width of
these transformed images could be appropriately adjusted as
needed (e.g., 32 for the file size below 10KB and 64 between
10KB to 30KB). Once the width of the image is fixed, we
can change its corresponding height depending on the file size.
Figure 1 illustrates the flowchart of malware transformation
process with a binary file from the MS BIG database [40],
where a common Trojan horse download program (Dontovo
A) is converted to an 8-bit grayscale image with the width of
64. The distinctive image texture is used to describe various
primitive binary fragments in malware image and each special
section is elaborated in the transformed visualization grayscale
image. As shown in Figure 1, code segments of .text, .rdata,
.data and .rsrc corresponds to 8-bit grayscale images.
Visualization technology provides a new direction for the
study of malware. ML-based detection methods is used
combined with visualization to improve the efficiency and
accuracy of malware detection [40].
Malware Binary
100101001110100011
10101011101010...
Bytes 
files
Binary to 
8 bit vector 
8 Bit Vector to 
Grayscale Image
.text
.rdata
.data
.rsrc
94 8 ...
7 01 ...
5 2 04 ...
... ... ... ...
E EA
C BB
E C
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Process of Malware visualization transformation
B. Machine Learning-based Detection Method
In the transformed malware image, the intensity, variance,
skewness, kurtosis, and the average intensity value of each
pixel are between 0 and 255. It is straight to extract feature
information from the byteplot using Wavelet and Gabor-based
methods, for example. After feature extraction, the data set will
be used to construct the discriminative model. In the following,
three popular ML algorithms are discussed, which are the case
studies to be evaluated.
1) Random forest
Random forests (RF) is an ensemble learning method
for classification, regression and detection. RF constructs a
multitude of decision trees at training time and produce the
corresponding results according to the model classification and
mean prediction of the individual trees [41]. In this paper,
RF training algorithm uses bootstrap aggregating and bagging
for tree learners. Given a training set X = x1, ..., xn with
responses Y = y1, ..., yn, bagging repeatedly (B times) selects
a random sample with replacement of the training set and fits
trees respectively. For b = 1, ..., B, we train a classification
or regression tree as fb on Xb, Yb. The predictions for unseen
samples x′ is shown below by averaging the predictions from
all the individual regression trees on x′.
fˆ =
1
B
B∑
b=1
fb(x
′)
Alternatively, an estimate of the prediction uncertainty could
be made as the prediction’s standard deviation from all the
individual regression trees on x′ by taking the majority vote
in the case of classification trees.
σ =
√∑B
b=1(fb(x
′)− fˆ)2
B − 1
where the number of samples/trees (B) is a free parameter. Gen-
erally, hundreds to several thousand trees are used depending
on the size and nature of training set. We use Cross-validation
and out-of-bag error to obtain the appropriate number of trees
(B) with a stable training and test.
2) Support Vector Machine
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a widely used machine
learning algorithm [42], [43], which aims to fit a hyperplane
to separate both classes in a dataset with the largest possible
margin M . In the SVM-based linear classification method, the
unknown sample(x) can obtain a better classification effect in
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the generated hyperplane by optimizing the weight vector(w)
and threshold (ρ) in decision function. The expression of
assigned labels (y) is as follows,
y(x) = wTx− ρ
Similarly, if the difference between malware images is too
large and therefore we cannot fit the dataset with a linear
model, we can simulate the dataset as a non-linear data
distribution. Nonlinear decision functions are able to map
samples into a feature space with special properties by applying
a nonlinear transformation, called Reproducing Kernel Space.
Therefore, choosing an appropriate nonlinear kernel function
K(x1, x2) is important for the classification and detection
analysis. Compared with the primal solution (e.g. weight w),
this method through solving the parameter α can be used
not only for solving nonlinear decision functions but also for
dealing with the variant of dual SVM learning problem. For
the specificity of the decision function, we use the K(x, xi)
to represent the imaged sample, where x denotes an unknown
sample that needs to be compared and xi denotes the selected
test sample in training dataset. Constructing a data pair for the
parallel dataset is commonly referred to as a support vector
and its expression is:
y(x) =
∑
ε∈SV
αiyik(x, xi)− ρ.
3) Convolutional Neural Networks
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) [44] is a computing
system inspired by the biological neural networks, which
is based on a collection of connected units or nodes called
artificial neurons and then organized in interconnected layers
(analogous to biological neurons in the animal brain). The
activation function is applied in each neuron to activate its input
to produce a corresponding output. Starting from the model
input, each layer of network produces an output which is used
as an input by the next layer. ANNs with a single intermediate
layer (called hidden layer) are qualified as shallow neural
networks and some with multiple hidden layers are called as
Deep Neural Networks (DNN), such as Convolutional Neural
Networks(CNN) [45]. The basic structure of CNN typically
consists of convolutional layers, pooling layers, fully connected
layers and normalization layers. Multiple hidden layers are
used for extracting representations hierarchically from the
input, and then output a representation or prediction relevant to
the problem requirement. As visualization images, the feature
information of malware is gradually enlarged by the extraction
of multiple layers. CNN model F can be viewed as a simple
mathematical model defining a function F : x→ y, in which
F can be formalized as the composition of multidimensional
and parameterized functions fi() corresponding to the layer
of network architecture. The simplified formula is shown as
follows:
F : x→ fn(...f2(f1(x, θ1), θ2)..., θn),
where a set of model parameters θi is learned during training.
Each vector θi includes the weights for links to connect layer
i to layer i − 1. Taking supervised learning as an example,
parameter values can be estimated based on the prediction
errors f(x)− y through an input-output pair (x, y).
IV. ADVERSARIAL TEXTURE MALWARE PERTURBATION
ATTACK (ATMPA)
Feature extraction and data reduction are commonly used
in numerical models, therefore malware may exist within the
real world data samples due to the specificity and camouflage.
Introducing AEs is of high possibility to produce the opposite
result against the original results, which leads to severe security
threat [23]. To ideally demonstrate such vulnerability, we
propose an Adversarial Texture Malware Perturbation Attack
(ATMPA) method in this paper. Our proposal is used to
interfere with several ML-based visualization detectors. In the
following, we first introduce the proposed ATMPA method and
corresponding application schemes, then describe the generation
of malware AEs based on the proposed ATMPA.
A. Framework
The attack model involved in this paper is that attackers
can interfere with malware images during the visualisation
transformation without being identified by the original detectors,
as shown in Figure 2a. As there exist some corresponding
mechanisms [5], [39], [46] between binary code and visualised
images, the malware images can be converted back to the
corresponding form of the binary code [39], [47]). AEs can
be converted back to the corresponding binary code through
the reverse transformation to achieve the attack effect. The
framework of ATMPA consists of three functional modules:
data transformation, adversarial pre-training and malware
detection. Malware detection functions include AE crafting
and perturbed detection. The overall ATMPA architecture is
shown in Figure 2a. If there is no attack in the process, i.e. no
AE involved, the second module adversarial pre-training will
not exist, as shown in Figure 2b. Otherwise, the code segments
of malware will be transformed to grayscale images in data
transformation module. Malware images will send directly to
ML-based malware detectors such as CNN, SVM and RF. The
green detection arrow indicates the normal detection process
in Figure 2b.
Considering the AE attacks, we introduced a new module,
named adversarial pre-training. After a series of preprocessing
including data transformation and normalization operations,
the malware dataset required for generating AEs is processed
in the AE pre-training module and the dataset used for test
will be propagated to malware detection module, as shown in
Figure 2a. In the AE pre-training module, attackers can use
deep learning methods, such as CNN or RNN to obtain an AE
crafting model by training a known malware dataset (shown
in the purple block of Figure 2a). Then, taking advantages of
the AE crafting model, attackers can perform the interference
functioning as noise signal δ on the targeted sample. Based
on the achieved AE crafting model and different AE attacking
methods, such as FSGM and C&W’s attack, attackers can
apply small but intentionally worst-case perturbations on the
transformed malware images. It is difficult to observe such
perturbations for other users.
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Fig. 2: The Architecture of the ML-based Malware visualization Detection Process
When the original information has been obstructed, the
targeted (or un-targeted) AEs coupled with original dataset are
propagated to the malware detector. As original detectors are
usually not able to resist AEs, the ML-based malware detectors
will be induced to produce an incorrect result that is desired
by the attacker, as illustrated in the red arrow in Figure 2a. To
evaluate the universal applicability of the ATMPA framework,
we choose commonly used CNN, SVM and RF-based ML
detectors.
B. Training process for Visualization-based Malware Detec-
tor
Since our proposed ATMPA method is not designed for a
single detector, we have designed different types of detectors
based on CNN, SVM, and RF in the module of malware
detection. There are two training processes in this module: one
is to achieve the normal malware detectors and the other is to
obtain the AEs.
1) Pre-training process for malware detector
To obtain more accurate ML-based detectors, the pre-training
process is usually performed with training samples to build
a discriminant model. According to the discriminant model,
the analyst can make a detection with the visualised malware
images. As it shows in Figure 2b, we can see that different
detectors in Normal detector Process have been pre-trained
with the transformed malware dataset. This paper uses CNN,
(e.g. GoogLeNet), and SVM and RF algorithms to build
corresponding malware detectors.
2) Training process for Adversarial Pre-training
Besides, the proposed ATMPA method also uses GoogLeNet
to craft malware AEs in the pre-training process. We use the
binary indicator vector X to represent malware samples without
any particular structural properties or interdependencies. In the
AE-training network, we apply a feed-forward neural network
and the rectifier is used as the activation function for each
hidden neuron. Standard gradient descent and dropout are also
used for training. For normalization of the output probabilities,
we also employ a softmax layer, where the output is computed
as:
Fi(X) =
exi
ex0+ex1 , xi =
∑mn
j=1 wj,i · xj + bj,i.
where, F (·) is an activation function, xi denotes to the i− th
input to a neuron, w is the weight vector in gradient descent
and b represents the corresponding typical values.
Therefore, during the processing of AE generation in our
ATMPA method, there is no need for attackers to construct
a new AE-training model. AEs can be achieved by using a
similar CNN structure for maleware detector training, therefore
the crafted AEs are difficult to detect and we can easily attack
ML-based malware detectors.
C. Crafting Adversarial Malware Examples
It is usually difficult for attackers to invade the malware
detector itself. However, attackers are able to modify samples
to disguise their original counterparts. AEs x∗ are created to
make a subtle and hardly detectable change to a data sample
x in the form of x∗ = x + δ. Despite the detector having
correctly classified result in x, the target detector would produce
an incorrect result because of the perturbation from AE x∗.
In order to deceive the malware detector and induce it to
present the wrong result (against benign label in attack mode),
two popular AE generation methods (FGSM and C&W) are
optimized and then be used in this paper.
1) FGSM-based method
FGSM is a fast method to generate AEs [12] and selects
a perturbation parameter by differentiating this cost function
with respect to the input itself. Along the direction of the
gradient’s sign at each pixel point, FGSM only performs one
step gradient update. The perturbation can be expressed as:
δ = ε · sign(∇xJθ(x, l)), (1)
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where ε is a small scalar value that restricts the magnitude of
the perturbation and represents the distortion between AEs and
original sample. sign(·) denotes the sign function,∇xJθ(·, ·)
computes the gradient of the cost function J around the current
value x of the model parameters θ. l is the label of x.
By using gradient-based method, we first compute the
detector’s gradient ∇(·) with respect to input X to estimate
the variant direction. The perturbation δ in X would change
the output of f(·). In the FGSM crafting method, we use
the Eq. (1) to represent the perturbation information. We will
also choose a better perturbation δ of input X with maximal
positive gradient into the target class y∗, and bring it into the
next fitting step. If the label y∗ belongs to a benign sample
label, the crafted AE sample x′ is a pseudo-benign AE sample.
Moreover, in order to better mislead the classification, we
have exploited an index i with FGSM by finding the maximum
gradient in the changing of the target class, as
i = argmax
i
(∇xiJθ(xi, y∗)).
We repeat this process with index i until either the pre-
judgment result f(·) producing the misclassification, i.e.
argmax
i
(f(x∗)) = y∗, or the index value reaching the
threshold of imax. The smaller i is, the smaller number of
iterations is needed to generated AEs and the more efficient
the FGSM method is.
Using the FGSM method as an example in Figure 3, we
illustrate the process of crafting malware image AEs with
subtle obstruction in details. The original malware sample
can be recognized by the detector with 88.5% confidence.
After the perturbation with the distortion (ε = 0.35) through
FGSM method, the perturbed malware sample could induce the
detector to output the Benign sample with 99.8% confidence.
By adjusting the value of the interference parameter ε, subtle
perturbation (δ) will be introduced to the original samples along
the direction of the gradient variant. But this subtle perturbation
is difficult to be observed by other users. Algorithm 1 illustrates
the pseudo-code of the way to generate AEs, along with the
corresponding explanation. The perturbation will be controlled
to guarantee that we will not cause a negative change in X
due to intermediate changes of the gradient.
2) C&W’s attack-based method
Carlini and Wagner summarized the distance metrics used
in the previous related work and proposed a new attack
strategy with L0, L2, L∞ norm, named C&W’s Attack [14].
By optimising the penalty term and distance metrics, the three
different Lp norm attack have been proposed correspondingly,
as the formula below:
min ‖δ‖2p s.t. g(x+ δ) = y∗ & x+ δ ∈ X, (2)
where Lp norm penalty ensures that the added perturbation ε
is small. The same optimization procedure with different L-
norm can achieve the similar attacks with a modified constraint
g(x+ δ) 6= y.
Just for l2 attack as a example, the perturbation δ is defined
in terms of an auxiliary variable w as
δ = 12 (tanh(w) + 1)− x.
  
x ( ( , , ))xsign J x y     
*x x  
“Obfuscator.ACY”
88.5% confidence
“Benign sample”
99.8% confidence
Fig. 3: Process of Perturbed Visualized Malware
Then, to find a δ(the perturbation), we optimize w as,
min
w
‖ 12 (tanh(w) + 1)‖2 + c · g( 12 (tanh(w) + 1)), (3)
where g(·) is an objective function based on the hinge loss,
g(x∗) = max(max
δ
(Z(x∗)i)− Z(x∗)t,−κ).
Here, Z(·)i represents the softmax function for class i and
mostly linear from the input x to the adversarial, t is the target
class, and κ denotes a constant to control the confidence with
which the misclassification occurs.
In the proposed ATMPA method, Lp-based C&W’s attack
method is also introduced to generate malware AEs, including
the l0, l2 & l∞ attack. According to the detector’s hierarchical
structure in malware images, we modified the optimization
formulation and optimized AE generating process in ATMPA
Algorithm 1 Crafting Adversarial Example for Malware image
with FGSM-based method
Input: x, y, ε, f(·), k
Output: x∗, δ
x∗ ← x
//Data preprocessing with x
while argmax
j
f(x∗) 6= y and ‖δx‖ < k do
∇f(x∗), //compute forward derivative
x∗ = x+ ε · sign(∇xJθ(x, ylabel))
imax = argmaxj∈1...|x|,Xj=0
∂fy(X)
∂Xj
if imax ≤ 0 then
return Failure
end if
X∗imax = 1
δx ← x∗ − x
end while
return x∗
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Algorithm 2 Crafting Adversarial Example for Malware image
with C&W’s attack-based method
Input: x, y, ε, f(·)
Output: x∗, δ
x∗ ← x
//Data preprocessing with x
δ = 12 (tanh(w) + 1)− x.
while argmin
δ
(D(x, x+ δ)) and f(x∗) 6= y do
min
w
‖ 12 (tanh(w) + 1)‖2 + c · g( 12 (tanh(w) + 1)),
//Optimize w
g(x∗) = max(max
δ
(Z(x∗)i)− Z(x∗)t,−κ),
//where,Z(·)i is the softmax function for class i
Optimize the c · g(·) with Ri&Di
c · g(x∗) = r · gr(x∗) + d · gd(x∗)
//where, r and d are chosen via binary search
if wmax ≤ 0 then
return Failure
end if
δ = ε · 12 (tanh(w) + 1)− x,
//update δ
x∗ ← x+ δ
end while
return x∗
method [48]. Taking l2 attack for instance, we optimise the
formula in Eq. 2 as
min ‖x∗ − x‖22, s.t. f(x∗) 6= f(x). (4)
where the original single optimization item c · g(x∗) from the
formula min ‖x∗ − x‖22 + c · g(x∗) in Eq. 3 are divided into
two parts as Ri& Di in the formula 4. Here, Ri = r · gr(x∗)
and Di = d · gd(x∗) are expressed as lr(x∗) and ld(x∗),
denoting the corresponding loss function in classifier and
detector. The r and d are chosen via binary search. By doing
so, the proposed ATMPA method could be improved in the
property of universality and expendability.
Algorithm 2 illustrates the pseudo-code of the optimisation
to generate AEs with the C&W’s attack-based method in l2
norm attack, along with the corresponding explanation.
V. EXPERIMENT
Experimental evaluation is conducted in terms of the
effectiveness and transferability. We firstly introduce the setup
of the experiment, such as necessary routines for preprocessing
the collected dataset. Three visualization detectors based on
CNN, SVM and RF are used as case studies to evaluate the
effectiveness of ATMPA. Furthermore, the transferability of
the ATMPA is analyzed between different detection algorithms
by using the same set of generated AEs. In general, the higher
the transferability rate is, the more transferable the proposed
attack framework can be effectively applied to other ML-based
malware detectors. Cross-validation for statistical evaluation is
also used to analyze the reliability of our proposed ATMPA.
The detailed descriptions of each experiment are as follows.
TABLE I: The MS BIG dataset with malware class
distribution and benign samples
Types of Malware Number of Samples
Ramnit (R) 1534
Lollipop (L) 2470
Kelihos ver3 (K3) 2942
Vundo (V) 451
Simda (S) 41
Tracur (T) 685
Kelihos ver1 (K1) 386
Obfuscator.ACY(O) 1158
Gatak (G) 1011
Benign sample(B) 1000
A. Dataset
To evaluate the performance of the proposed method, we use
an open source malware dataset in Kaggle Microsoft Malware
Classification Challenge (BIG 2015). It consists of 10,867
labeled malware samples with nine classes. To collect benign
examples, we scrap all the valid executables on Windows 7 and
Windows XP on the virtual machine. We select 1000 benign
samples by using anti-virus vendors in VirusTotal intelligence
search 1. The distribution of these samples is illustrated in
Table I. Considering the robustness and expandability of the
structure in artificial neural network, we adopt the state-of-the-
art deep neural network, GoogleNet Inception V3 architecture2
for AE generation. Finally, the FGSM and C&W’s attack
methods are used to generate AEs (x∗) with the perturbation
(δ). In this paper, our constructed AEs are the type of targeted
AEs, which are able to disguise the malware as a benign sample
to deceive the detector. We called them pseudo-benign sample
in this paper.
B. Attack Effectiveness
The effectiveness of ATMPA is evaluated by attacking three
commonly used malware detectors based on CNN (GoogleNet
), SVM and RF algorithms. Through the method of 10-fold
cross-validation, the original malware sample set is randomly
partitioned into ten equal sized subsample sets. One set of
subsamples is replaced by AE samples as the tested data to
measure the successful rate (%) of attacks and the remaining
nine sets of subsample are used as training and detection. The
rate of 100% denotes that all of the AEs can successfully
induce the detector while 0% indicates that AEs are all
recognized. Different AEs can be generated by using the
FGSM method with a slight adjustment in the distortion
parameter ε and applying different norms-based C&W methods.
The experimental results demonstrate that all three ML-based
detectors are easily mislead, especially for the attack on CNN-
based detectors. The effectiveness of attacks and comparison
analysis are illustrated in details respectively.
1) CNN
To begin with, we use the pseudo-benign AEs to attack
a CNN visualization detector built on GoogleNet Inception
V3. Under the 10 iterations of the gradient descent direction,
1https://www.virustotal.com/en/
2https://github.com/BartyzalRadek/Multi-label-Inception-net
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Fig. 4: Comparison result of FGSM Attack in basic learning methods and feature-extracted combined method
attackers just need to adjust the default distortion parameter ε
around a default value, and then the CNN-based detector can
be easily induced and produce the wrong results. Through
the analysis of cross-validation, we find that if the value
of the distortion parameter ε is adjusted to ε = 0.4, the
successful rate of attacks is 100%, as shown in Table II. It
is clear to see that the successful rate is increased with the
corresponding increase of distortion value (ε) in Figure 4.
CNN-based detection methods are generally considered as a
robust method with high accuracy, particularly for dealing with
visualization-based image classification problems. However, the
experimental results demonstrate that CNN-based applications
is vulnerable to AEs.
Furthermore, if we limit a small learning rate such as 0.05
to prevent the feature information of original sample from fast
extraction, AEs generated from C&W’s attack could easily
mislead the CNN-based detectors under 100 iterations of
gradient descent direction. In Table III, we list the successful
rate with different distortion values in different L-norms
distance to express the high successful rate in C&W’s attack.
If attackers just change the interference parameters with 0.2 to
0.4 and the generated AEs can achieve a successful rate with
100% for all the attacks on the CNN-based detector.
2) SVM
Because of the different mechanisms between SVM and
CNN, SVM-based malware detector is attacked to verify
the scalability of the proposed ATMPA. In this experiment,
we contrast a SVM-based malware detector with the default
parameters (γ = 0.1, C = 102 and k = 10) in the open source
code libsvm3. As it shows in Table II, when the value of
distortion(ε) has been set to 0.5, the attackers can obtain a
3https://github.com/cjlin1/libsvm
TABLE II: Attacking method with FGSM method
Detection Methods Distortion(ε) Successful rate(%)
CNN Basic CNN 0.4 100Wavelet+CNN 0.5 100
SVM Basic SVM 0.5 100Wavelet+SVM 0.6 99.8
RF Basic RF 0.4 100Wavelet+RF 0.6 99.7
successful rate of 100%. Comparing with other basic detect
methods, even though the distortion value in SVM is the biggest,
the SVM-based detector is still difficult to resist the attack from
ATMPA. Meanwhile, according to the successful rate with the
increased curve (blue dashed line) in Figure 4a. It is clear
that with the increasing of distortion in FGSM-based attack
the successful rate could close to 100% gradually. Once the
value of distortion(ε) is over 0.4, the corresponding SVM-based
detector will become invalid.
3) RF
Apart from CNN and SVM-based detectors, we also use the
pseudo-benign AEs to attack the RF-based detector with the
default parameter settings (mtree = 1000, ntree = 100) from
open source code4. By using statistical evaluation methods in
10-fold cross validation, the mean successful rate could be
easy to reach 99.7% if the distortion value set to 0.6 in FGSM
method. In addition, the similar successful rate is reached
when C&W-based method is used, as it listed in Table III.
If attackers set the distortion value over 0.36, e.g., all of the
L-noram attacks (including l0, l2&l∞) can successfully induce
the RF-based detector. Therefore, we can conclude that the
proposed ATMPA method is reasonable to attack RF-based
detectors.
4) Comparisons Analysis
Comparison of attack effect for different ML algorithms are
discussed in the following. At first, for CNN-based detector,
the experimental results show that the robustness of anti-
AE ability in CNN-based method is the most vulnerable to
ATMPA. Both of the CNN and RF based detectors are not
better than the other widely used SVM-based detection method.
4https://github.com/cran/randomForest
TABLE III: Attacking Result with C&W’s attack method
Detection Methods Distortion Successful rate(%)
L0 L2 L∞
CNN Basic CNN 0.23 0.30 0.36 100Wavelet+CNN 0.34 0.41 0.40 100
SVM Basic SVM 0.51 0.43 0.40 100Wavelet+SVM 0.69 0.65 0.32 99.7
RF Basic RF 0.49 0.43 0.39 100Wavelet+RF 0.56 0.52 0.49 100
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More interestingly, for SVM-based detector, it demonstrates a
superior performance in resisting adversarial attack compared
with other detection methods with higher distortion value (as
listed in Table II). Some comparing analysis is made in terms
of the curvature and gradient of these three curves in Figure 4a,
where the curve of SVM-based detector illustrates the best
robustness. However, the ability of anti-induction is limited.
As long as a slight adjustment in distortion scale in the FGSM
and C&W’s method, such as increasing the strength of 10%,
the ATMPA method can easily break out the defense from
SVM-based detector. The mean value of distortion from cross-
validation analysis is larger than others, it reflects that the
ATMPA method can provide with a good model transferability.
Namely, our proposed attacking method can be extended to
liner-based surprised learning method. With respect to the RF-
based detector, the ATMPA method demonstrates some very
similar features when attacking different detectors between
RF and CNN respectively, according to the comparison in
Table II and Figure 4a. On the one hand, there is a similar
increasing trend for the curvature of the whole increased curve.
On the other hand, when the attacking efficiency reaches the
full attack (e.g. the successful rate is 100%), the distortion
values (ε) that are required to generate AEs are also very close,
generally with the size of 0.5 in Table II. Therefore, the ability
of defending ATMPA in RF-based malware detectors is very
limited compared to the SVM counterpart.
C. Attack Transferability
Transferability comparison is implemented in two aspects.
From the perspective of similar types of detection methods,
using the same AEs set from ATMPA, we attack the the similar
detectors such as CNN and wavelet-combined CNN detectors.
From the perspective different types of detection methods,
we also use the same AEs set from ATMPA, but attack the
the different detectors, such as CNN vs. SVM or CNN vs.
wavelet-combined SVM detectors.
In this section, the wavelet transformation is used to
strengthen the robustness on ML-based detection methods.
Wavelet transformation, a classical technique of feature extrac-
tion and spatial compression [49], has been applied in many
research fields and wavelet-combined ML methods have been
widely used in the field of image classification. If the malware
image is processed through the wavelet transformation, the
sparse space of its own image will be compressed. The feature
information will be extracted and the noise or other interference
information will also be weakened, the overall performance
will hence be improved. In this section, we use the same group
of AEs to attack CNN, SVM and RF-based malware detectors
optimized by using wavelet5 technique. Once the generated
AEs are successful to induce the optimised detector, which
represents that ATMPA leads to an equal effect on the optimized
detector. Comparison results in terms of the transferability rate
are shown in Table IV.
1) Wavelet-CNN
To attack the wavelet-combined CNN detector (Wavelet-
CNN), ATMPA can defeat the detector with a strong trans-
5https://github.com/PyWavelets/pywt
TABLE IV: Transferability rate in different detectors with ATMPA
CNN SVM RF Wavelet-CNN Wavelet-SVM Wavelet-RF
CNN 100% 57.8% 86.3% 88.5% 54.2% 75.6%
SVM 64.5% 100% 75.5% 54.2% 85.7% 64.5%
RF 81.5% 45.6% 100% 67.9% 48.2% 88.7%
ferability. By increasing the range of the distortion value (ε),
Wavelet-CNN detector can be induced to produce the malware
as a benign label. The error rate of the detector will rise from
85% to 100% through increasing the intensity of the distortion
degree in FGSM method. Similarly, the wavelet-CNN detector
will also produce an error rate of 100% when using C&W’s
attack. Attackers only need to increase the distortion range from
0.15 to 0.18 on the different of L-norm distances. Generally,
AEs can be successfully induced the CNN-based detectors
in accordance with the attacker’s pre-set label y∗, when the
distortion value is more than 0.50. whether FGSM or C&W is
used, the generated AEs (SAE) can achieve a 100% successful
rate in terms of attacking the CNN-based and wavelet-combined
detectors. The same AE set (SAE) will be applied to test
the transferability by attacking different detectors. Experiment
results show that the maximum value of transferability is 88.5%
and the minimum value is 54%. CNN-based detection methods
can hardly resist attacks from ATMPA.
2) Wavelet SVM
Wavelet-combined SVM (Wavelet-SVM) detection is also
used to measure the transferability of the ATMPA method.
Wavelet-SVM malware detector is more resistant than Wavelet-
CNN methods, but is still difficult to resist the attack from
ATMPA. With a fixed distortion parameter (ε) as ε = 0.4
and ε = 0.5, wavelet-SVM shows the lowest success rate.
The ability of resisting AEs has been greatly improved in the
SVM-based detectors.
As for the comparison between Wavelet-SVM and SVM-
based detectors, the Wavelet-SVM can resist 20% ∼ 30%
AE attacks, even though such AEs can make the SVM-based
detector completely fail. The transferability rate in different
detectors of the same classified samples is shown in Table IV,
such as 64.5% to CNN and 54.2% to wavelet-CNN.
When the distortion parameter is set to ε = 0.3 in FGSM, or
the L-norm distance to 0.71 in C&W, the originally stable anti-
AE’s SVM detector will be easily attacked as well. Therefore,
even though the wavelet-SVM detector is more resistant to
AEs, attackers can also fully induce these detectors by choosing
appropriate perturbations.
3) Wavelet RF
By comparing the RF and wavelet-RF detectors, the transfer-
ability of the proposed ATMPA method is robust. As shown in
Table IV, the maximum transferability rate is 88.7%. We follow
the calculation parameters as the above default settings (as
mtree = 1000, ntree = 100). Wavelet-RF detection method
can express a certain robustness when resisting the attack from
AEs, but the defensive ability is extremely limited. Taking the
FGSM method as an example, when the distortion value ε set
as ε = 0.4, the successful rate of attacking the conventional
RF detector can reach 100%. If the distortion parameter
increases 15%, the attack on wavelet-RF will achieve the
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same successful rate of 100%. As for C&W’s attack methods,
the attacking effect does not produce a very large fluctuation
even with the introduction of wavelet-combined technique.
Through increasing the distance values of L1, L2, L∞ by
approximately 11.5% , setting the values as 0.45, 0.55, 0.65
respectively, the pseudo-benign AEs generated by the C&W’s
attack method can achieve the same 100% successful attack
rate. ATMPA constructed by C&W’s attack method will have
a better transferability than FGSM version. The C&W-based
ATMPA will be easier to attack RF and CNN-based detectors.
VI. DEFENSIVE STRATEGY AGAINST MALWARE AE
By analysing differences between different AEs and the
original samples, the iterative processing of generating AEs and
the algorithm structure oin different detectors, we summarise
some qualitative defensive strategies to defend AE attack.
At first, we compare the mean distance D∗x and D
t
x between
the original inputs (x) and corresponding normal AE samples
(x∗) and pseudo-benign AE samples xt. We find that both D∗x
and Dtx have similar values, with the proportion of 1:1.08.
The normal AEs (x∗) generated for obstructing malware
detectors perform similarly to pseudo-benign AEs (xt) and
its correspoding mathematical distribution is also close to
the uniform distribution, which express the universality and
expansibility in AE crafted process to confuse the analyst.
Therefore, by the subtle perturbation which is hard to be
observed it is easy for these AEs to induce the detection
result from the detectors.
The process of AE generation fits along the optimal gradient
of variants in the target category, therefore, whatever the target
label is (even irrelevant), the detector will finally be induced
to produce the result desired by attackers. Taking the FGSM
method as an example, Figure 5 shows the variant trend of the
absolute value (|l|) of gradient loss (l) in the objective function
f(·) with the number of iterations (t) growing. For the target
sample (x) of the first iteration, the gradient loss (l) of the
sample (x) has the largest value (as l0 = 3.61× 10−3). With
the subtle obstructions in each variable along the direction
of gradient descent, the value of gradient loss (l) will rapidly
reduce to zero, which shows a reduction in magnitude of two
orders. The entire process of AE generation can be considered
as learning stage for target sample (x). Therefore, the malware
visualization detection method based on level-by-level learning
methods is difficult to resist the attack from AEs.
Since AEs used in this paper are based on a CNN with
hierarchical structure, some ML algorithms such as SVM
have linear structures. That is why the SVM and wavelet-
SVM based malware detectors can resist this kind of AE
attack to some extent and RF and CNN-based detectors with
similar hierarchical discriminant structure are vulnerable to AE
attacks. We can utilize this feature to resist the AE attack with
appropriate ML algorithms
As is shown in Table IV, when we use ATMPA to attack
detectors with the similar algorithmic structures, their trans-
ferability rates are usually higher than those with different
algorithmic structures. For example, from CNN to RF the
transferability rate is 86.3%, but from RF to SVM the
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Fig. 5: The Loss value with iterative
rate reduces to 45.6%. Therefore, AEs generated by using
neural networks (NNs), for example, can not only make the
conventional detectors fail but also attack other algorithms
in similar structure with a high transferability. Therefore, it
is difficult to defend AE attack for conventional NN-based
malware detector.
However, some possible defensive strategies are proposed
against the AT attack based on the above observations
• According to the similarity among different AEs and
distribution features among different perturbation values
(δ), the detection accuracy will be improved if the dateset
can be pre-preprocessed to expand the difference between
samples.
• According to the generation process of AEs including the
variation characteristics of gradient loss (l) and iteration
number (t), the feature information of the normal samples
could avoid to be learned by attackers through the process
of expanding the dataset or improving their differences.
• According to the characteristic of different algorithmic
structures in malware detectors and AE generation process,
it would be useful that defenders can build a security
module to resist the obstruction from AEs in ML-based
malware visualization detection. For example, the linear
optimization detection based on Linear Discriminant
Analysis (LDA), Logistic Regression and Hyperplane
Separating method can be used.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose the first attack framework ATMPA
that uses adversarial examples to challenge visualized malware
detectors. The ATMPA uses the gradient-based FGSM method
and L-norm based C&W’s attack method to generate AEs on the
converted image dataset. The tested ML-based visualization
detector are all unable to determine the malware correctly.
Experimental results demonstrate that just very weak adver-
sarial noise can achieve 100% successful attack rate for CNN,
SVM and RF-based malware detectors. More importantly, the
transferability rate when attacking different malware detectors
is up to 88.7%.
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In future, a new malware defense method using adversarial
examples could be designed to simulate the variant of malware,
so as to enhance the sample dataset which to be trained. In
combination with adversarial training or generative adversarial
network (GAN), it will increase the ability of defense against
zero-day attacks. Secondly, adversarial examples are trained
per classification problem, meaning that they can operate on
the set of labels that have been trained. Switching to an
alternative set of labels is likely to reduce their attacking
effectiveness. Another interesting future research topic could be
to develop ATMPA for these scenarios, e.g. for hierarchy-based
labels (such as Animal-Horse-Zebra). Finally, the study and
introduction of ATMPA can be used into other modalities, such
as sound/speech processing to address users with recognition
impairments.
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